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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the effects of monetary policy on the risk-taking behaviour of 
Chinese banks in the presence of involuntary excess reserves based on a sample of 95 banks. 
We find that involuntary excess reserves appear to lead to more aggressive risk-taking in the 
Chinese banking market. This implies that the large involuntary excess reserves stimulate the 
rapid expansion of credit and the price bubble in the Chinese financial market. However, 
banks with larger involuntary excess reserves tend to reduce risk-taking more rapidly under 
the tightening monetary policy regime. The sheds lights on the effectiveness of government 
monetary policy in reducing the risk-taking behaviour of banks in an emerging market where 





Easy monetary conditions are a classic ingredient of financial crisis (Borio and Zhu, 2008; 
Gambacorta, 2009). It is therefore not surprising that, recent studies have examined how 
monetary policy may contribute to an excessive expansion of credit and consequently banks’ 
risk-taking behaviour. Expansionary monetary policy strengthens banks’ net-worth, induces 
banks to increase leverage by expanding assets aggressively and banks’ risk-taking, pointing 
to a different dimension of the monetary transmission mechanism, the so-called risk-taking 
channel (Borio and Zhu, 2008; Adrian and Shin, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010). Conversely, 
the extant literature on risk-taking channel largely supports the contention that tightening 
monetary policy tends to reduce banks’ risk-taking incentive (Jimenez et al., 2009; Ioannidou 
et al., 2009; Altunbas et al., 2010; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011). It 
is pertinent to note that while these studies have been in the context of both advanced market 
and emerging economies, the results have been mixed (see Delis and Brissimis, 2010; Delis 
and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Michalak, 2012; De Graeve et al., 2008; 
Buch et al., 2011). Moreover, prior studies have virtually not examined the topic in an 
emerging market economy such as China where the presence of large involuntary excess 
reserves
1
 in the banking system is large. The aggregate excess reserves beyond statutory 
requirements in Chinese banking system stood at an average of 10% of deposit base in the 
1990s and the early 2000s (Anderson, 2009; Laurens and Maino, 2009), although the ratio 
gradually fell to 3.3% in 2012
2
, yet it is judged to be high compared to banks in the US and 
Euro-zone countries and higher than precautionary level (Wei et al., 2008; Anderson, 2009; 
Ma et al., 2011). The large involuntary excess reserves in the Chinese banking system have 
raised some concerns regarding the forming of price bubble which may result in financial 
                                                 
1 Involuntary excess reserves is defined as unwanted reserve above the precautionary excess reserves level 
(Agenor et al., 2004) 
2
 Source: China Monetary Policy Reports, retrieved from the website of The People’s Bank of China 
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crisis (Zhang and Pang, 2008; Zhang, 2009; Yang, 2010; Huang et al., 2010; Guo and Li, 
2011). The presence of involuntary excess reserves indicates unwanted surplus liquidity 
(Agenor et al., 2004). It is argued that the low probability of illiquidity risk induces bank 
managers to relax credit lending standards and lend out more aggressively to increase 
managerial compensation which is often tied to credit volume and exacerbate agency problem 
(Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). While bank managers may be remunerated inversely to the risk 
they take, Acharya and Naqvi (2012) argue that the surplus liquidity environment makes the 
risk-taking behaviour easier to conceal. Yet, we know very little regarding the effectiveness 
of tightening monetary policy on risk-taking behaviour in a situation such as China where 
large involuntary excess reserves is present in the banking system. To fill this gap, we 
investigate the linkage between involuntary excess reserves, monetary policy and risk-taking 
bahaviour of banks in China. 
In this paper, we examine the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking behaviour of 
Chinese banks in the presence of involuntary excess reserves. The paper contributes to 
literature in two important ways: First, we clarify the impact of involuntary excess reserves 
on risk-taking behaviour of banks in an emerging market economy which has become more 
interconnected with the world economy and likely to play a more crucial role in future global 
financial crisis. Second, the study sheds lights on the effectiveness of government monetary 
policy in reducing the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context where involuntary excess 
reserves are present. The study therefore extends the risk-taking channel theory in the context 
where large involuntary excess reserves are present in the banking market. We find that 
involuntary excess reserves appear to lead to more aggressive risk-taking in the Chinese 
banking market. This implies that the large involuntary excess reserves may stimulate the 
rapid expansion of credit and the price bubble in the Chinese financial market. However, 
banks with larger involuntary excess reserves tend to reduce risk-taking more rapidly under 
the tightening monetary policy regime. The results provide support to Acharya and Naqvi’s 
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(2012) argument that the central bank should follow a ‘leaning against liquidity’ approach, 
i.e. the central bank should adopt tightening monetary policy at times when banks are awash 
with liquidity to hold back banks’ risk-taking incentive.         
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
risk-taking channel and develops the hypotheses of the study. Section 3 presents data used 
and methodology. Section 4 discusses the estimated results with additional analysis and 
robustness tests. Section 5 presents study summary and conclusions of the study.  
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Prior literature suggests that monetary policy has mixed effects on bank risk-taking.  While 
banks’ risk-taking is found to increase if the central bank reduces policy interest rates or 
keeps interest rate too low for too long (Gambacorta, 2009; De Nicolò et al., 2010; Gaggl and 
Valderrama, 2010; Angeloni et al., 2010; Delis and Brissimis, 2010; Delis and Kouretas, 
2011; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Michalak, 2012), other studies suggest that risk-taking 
decreases in response to the fall of monetary policy rates (De Graeve et al., 2008; Buch et al., 
2011). Nguyen and Boateng (2013) find that, in the presence of involuntary excess reserves, 
liquid banks and large banks tend to take greater risks, and hence, they become more 
vulnerable to monetary policy shocks in China. The following section discusses the 
hypotheses in respect of monetary policy, involuntary excess reserves and risk-taking 
behavior of Chinese banks which to the best of our knowledge no study has attempted to 
examine. 
2.1  Involuntary Excess Reserves and Risk-taking 
Agenor et al. (2004) point out that, banks may voluntarily hold reserves above the statutory 
level (precautionary excess reserves) to buffer liquidity need. The involuntary excess reserves 
above the precautionary level deemed to be unwanted liquidity may stimulate aggressive 
lending Agenor et al., 2004; Nguyen and Boateng, 2013). This argument is consistent with 
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the risk-taking theory which indicates that the surplus liquidity in the banking system leads to 
a perception of low probability of illiquidity risk among bank managers and consequently 
induces bank managers to take in more tail risk (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). However, tail 
risk is the kind of risk that can be easily concealed and generates severe adverse 
consequences; but offers generous compensation the rest of the time (Rajan, 2006). Low 
illiquidity risk makes the tail risk more easily to conceal, and therefore, the bank managers 
tend to take greater tail risk, relax lending standards and charge lending interest rate below 
the fundamental level to facilitate aggressively lending and increase remuneration which is 
often tied to credit volume (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). In China, the banking organisation 
structure reforms in 1994 changed the managers’ remuneration incentives from credit-plan 
adherence to loan revenue and credit default rate basis  (Naughton, 1998; Allen et al., 2011), 
and further reforms in 2002-2003 delegated lending decisions to loan managers and 
empowered them to set interest rates (Qian et al., 2011). The presence of involuntary excess 
reserves together with the volume-based remuneration is argued to induce risk-taking 
behaviour among Chinese bank managers. This argument leads to the first hypothesis that 
risk-taking has a positive relationship with involuntary excess reserves in the Chinese 
banking market. 
H1: The risk-taking of Chinese banks has a positive relationship with involuntary excess 
reserves. 
2.2  Monetary Policy, Involuntary Excess Reserves and Risk-taking 
The expansionary monetary policy strengthens net-worth of banks (Bernanke et al., 1999). 
Under the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission, the strengthened net-worth 
improves banks’ risk measurement, encourages banks to increase leverage and expand credit 
to borrowers whose risk measurement is also improved but business risk fundamentals 
remain unchanged, thus, banks’ risk-taking tends to increase (Borio and Zhu, 2008; Adrian 
and Shin, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010). Expansionary policy may also make banks search 
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for yield (Rajan, 2006) or signal the central banks’ policy stance on liquidity support if the 
market liquidity situation gets worse (Gambacorta, 2009; Altunbas et al., 2010), and 
therefore, banks are induced to take greater risk. Drawing on this reasoning, tightening 
monetary policy is argued to weaken banks’ net-worth, which in turn reduces risk-taking. 
Prior studies suggest that Taylor-Gap can better capture the monetary policy stance (Altunbas 
et al., 2010; Gaggl and Valderrama, 2010; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011 and Michalak, 2012). 
Taylor-Gap is the difference between the actual monetary policy interest rate and the rate 
implied by Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). According to Taylor’s rule (Taylor, 1993), monetary 
policy should pursue both short-term goal of stabilising the economy and long-term goal of 
moderating inflation. Taylor-Gap is measured as the residuals of Taylor-rule estimations 
where the monetary policy interest rates are regressed on gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth and inflation. Prior studies point out that the positive Taylor-Gap indicates the 
tightening monetary policy because the central bank sets the policy interest rate higher than 
the recommended rate based on Taylor rule (Altunbas et al., 2010; Gaggl and Valderrama, 
2010; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011 and Michalak, 2012). The higher the Taylor-Gap, the 
more strongly the monetary policy is tightened. Similarly, the negative Taylor-Gap indicates 
the expansionary monetary policy. As tightening monetary policy is argued to discourage 
risk-taking, it is hypothesised that risk-taking has a negative relationship with Taylor-Gap.  
H2: The risk-taking of Chinese banks has a negative relationship with Taylor-Gap. 
Because expansionary monetary policy encourages risk-taking and involuntary excess 
reserves also induce risk-taking, it is further argued that banks with larger involuntary excess 
reserves take greater risk during the expansionary monetary policy regime. When the 
monetary policy is tightened, the net-worth of banks is adversely affected (Bernanke et al., 
1999; Angeloni and Faia, 2009), the tail risk is materialised and becomes less likely to be 
concealed (Rajan, 2006); and therefore, the risk-taking incentive of involuntary excess 
reserve is argued to be reduced. Because banks with larger involuntary excess reserves are 
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argued to take greater tail risk during the expansionary monetary policy regime, their tail risk 
is materialised more rapidly and their net-worth which is more adversely affected during the 
tightening monetary policy regime. From the above argument, we can conjecture that, banks 
with larger involuntary excess reserves reduce risk-taking more rapidly in response to the 
tightening monetary policy. It is therefore hypothesised that bank risk-taking has a negative 
relationship the interaction between involuntary excess reserves and Taylor-Gap.  
H3: The risk-taking of Chinese banks has a negative relationship with the interaction between 
involuntary excess reserves and Taylor-Gap. 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1  Data  
We use the dataset compiled by Fitch’s International Bank Database, Bankscope. The sample 
covers the period from 2000 to 2011, and includes only banks whose data are available for at 
least three consecutive years. Only commercial banks are selected (state-owned commercial 
banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, rural commercial banks and 
foreign banks); thus, policy banks, cooperative banks and investment banks are not included 
in our sample because they may have different objectives than profitability. The final panel 
sample consists of 95 banks and 552 annual observations. Macro data (including national and 
provincial real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, inflation rate and Chinese 
monetary policy) are collected from China Securities Market and Accounting 
Research database (CSMAR), the World Bank online database, China Statistical Yearbook 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China), and the People Bank of China website. To ensure 
sufficient time-series data for Taylor-Gap estimations, macro data were collected for a longer 
period i.e., from 1994 to 2011 inclusively and 18 annual observations. 
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3.2  Involuntary Excess Reserve Ratio (IERR) Measure 
We adopt Agenor’s et al. (2004) framework and subsequently used by Nguyen and Boateng 
(2013) to decompose involuntary excess reserves from precautionary excess reserves. Agenor 
et al. (2004) developed a framework on the demand for precautionary excess reserves which 
is considered to be negative to requirement ratio but positive to both liquidity shock volatility 
and penalty rate on shortage of required reserves. We estimate demand for precautionary 
excess reserves and the estimation results are used to measure the involuntary excess reserves 
as the difference between actual excess reserves and the estimated precautionary excess 
reserves. Following Bindseil et al. (2006) we define excess reserves as the current account 
holdings of banks with the central bank beyond required reserves. Aikaeli (2011) argues that 
banks also tend to demand more excess reserves to buffer credit risk. To take this effect into 
account, we also incorporate credit risk as a determinant of precautionary excess reserves into 
Agenor’s et al. (2004) framework. Following Agenor et al. (2004), Aikaeli (2011) and 
Nguyen and Boateng (2013), we model the demand for precautionary excess reserves and the 
estimation residual is collected as the involuntary excess reserves ratio. 
1 , 1 2 3 4 5 6 7( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )it i t t itER ER L LR L CASH L YR L RRR L R YEAR                   (1) 
where τ is a constant term,  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a well-behaved error term and 𝛼𝑗(𝐿) are lag polynomials, 
defined as: 
11 ... , 2
p
j j jpL L j         (2)  
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Where: 𝐼𝐼𝐿, 𝐷, 𝑉 and 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 are interest income on loan, total customer deposit, vault cash and 
real GDP growth rate, respectively. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 is Hodrick-Prescott/Baxter-King filters.  
𝐸𝑅 is a ratio of excess reserves to deposits. 𝐸𝑅 is measured as the ratio of the difference 
between a bank’s current account balance with the central bank and required reserve3 over 
total customer deposit. Following Aikaeli (2011) and Nguyen and Boateng (2013), loan 
return volatility (𝐿𝑅) is used to capture credit risk that may trigger deposit withdrawals, LR is 
measured as the absolute value of the deviation of loan interest income from its trend 
identified by the filter method developed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997). Loan interest 
income is the ratio of interest income on loan to total customer deposit. Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (HP) is a standard method for removing trend movements in the business cycle 
literature (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). As loan return volatility implies a bank’s easy gain or loss, 
credit risk arises from both negative and positive deviations (Aikaeli, 2011), hence, the 
absolute value of the deviation is taken into consideration. 
CASH reflects cash-holding preference of depositors, measure by the volatility of the ratio of 
vault cash to total customer deposit by Hodrick-Prescott filter. YR is the ratio of real GDP 
growth rate to its trend (Hodrick-Prescott filter), capturing demand for cash. We also employ 
the filter developed by Baxter and King (1999) as an alternative method of measuring 
deviation. Moreover, RRR and R are the average reserve requirement ratio set by the People’s 
Bank of China (PBC) within a certain year and the refinance interest rate, respectively; the 
latter term is the rate that the PBC charges when lending to financial institutions for short-
                                                 
3 Required reserve is measured as the product of total customer deposit and reserve requirement ratio domestic 
currency deposit. Since reserve requirement ratio for foreign currency deposit is smaller than that for Renminbi 
(RMB) deposit, the total estimated reserve requirement is slightly higher than the actual value. However, the 
comparison with the actual value (where available) shows that the two values are very close because foreign 
currency deposit accounts for a very small fraction of total customer deposit.  
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term liquidity support (20-day call loan rate) and reflects the penalty cost if a bank falls short 
of the required amount of reserves. The model is estimated by System Generalised Method of 
Moments (SGMM) developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995); 
Blundell and Bond (1998). The optimal SGMM model is selected based on the criteria 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Roodman (2006) in Appendix 1. The number of 
lags is based on Aikaike Information Criteria (AIC). The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 which is free of unit 
root and serial correlation is collected to index involuntary excess reserve ratio. We denote 
IERR1 and IERR2 as involuntary excess reserve ratios obtained from the residuals of 
precautionary excess reserves estimations with Hodrick-Prescott filter and Baxter King filter 
methods, respectively. The estimations results show a significantly positive relationship 
between credit risk and the demand for precautionary excess reserves (results provided upon 
request).  
3.3  Monetary Policy Stance Index 
Prior studies point out that the relationship between monetary policy and risk-taking may be 
endogenous because central banks tend to adjust monetary policy rate based on the observed 
risk-taking behaviour of commercial banks (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011). We overcome this 
issue by two ways. First, we employ Generalised Method of Moments method (GMM) which 
provides efficient estimation with endogeneity problem (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Second, 
Altunbas et al. (2010), Gaggl and Valderrama (2010), Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) and 
Michalak (2012) argue that the use of Taylor-Gap can make the endogeneity problem 
between monetary policy and risk taking less significant, we use Taylor-Gap to index the 
monetary policy stance. The Taylor-Gap is obtained from the residual of the Taylor-rule 
estimation.  
The Taylor rule rate is algebraically expressed as below: 
* * * *
1[ ( | ) ]t c t t y tr a a E I a y       (6) 
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In which * *, ,t tr y  are target interest rate, target inflation rate and output gap (the difference 
between the actual GDP growth rate and the target GDP growth rate) respectively. Moreover, 
1t  is the realised annual inflation rate at time t , the parameter 
*
ca  
is the long-run equilibrium 
nominal interest rate. 
tI  is the information set available at time t . Since the inflation rate is 
highly persistent, 
1( | )t t tE I   is adopted by Taylor and many other authors (Fan et al., 
2011). Following Fan et al. (2011), we assume that 
1( | )t t tE I    and by denoting 
*a a  and 
* * *
c ca a a  the original Taylor equation above can be presented as: 
*
t c t y tr a a a y    (7)  
As argued by Fan et al. (2011) that in practice the central bank tends to smooth the actual 
interest rate and hence, it is widely accepted in the literature that the actual interest rate 
tr  is 
the weighted average of the target rate *
tr and its lag 1tr   , plus the noise term t . 
*
1(1 )t t t tr r r       ; where 0 1    (8) 
or equivalently:  
1(1 )( )t c t y t t tr a a a y r          (9) 
Regarding the policy interest rate in China, it is argued that Open Market Operation rate 
(OMO), which is the rate that PBC uses to sell or buy government bonds in the open market, 
does not necessarily signal monetary policy stance but is simply a sterilisation tool (Liu et al., 
2009; Chen et al., 2011). Similarly, reserve requirement increases do not necessarily reflect 
tightening monetary policy but serve to tame excess liquidity in the Chinese banking system 
(Anderson, 2009). In addition, Green and Chang (2006) find no relationship between money 
base M2 and reserve money in China, and argue that the PBC fails to manage M2 growth as 
an intermediary monetary goal. Therefore, the reserve requirement ratio and the money base 
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M2 cannot represent the Chinese monetary policy stance. In contrast, policy interest 
benchmark rates play very influential roles in expressing PBC’s monetary policy stance and 
have strong effects on market rates (He and Wang, 2012). However, Anderson (2009) and 
Porter and Xu (2009) point out that the policy deposit ceiling rates are strictly binding and 
signal the market-clearing equilibrium in China, but the lending benchmark rate is not 
binding in practice. Therefore, we use one-year deposit benchmark rate ( DB ) to capture the 
monetary policy interest rate (
tr ) in China. Although lending benchmark rate is not binding 
in practice, it may still signal the monetary policy stance from the PBC. To take the effect of 
lending benchmark into account, we follow Fan et al. (2011) and use the average rate of 
lending and deposit benchmarks ( LDB ) as an alternative measure of monetary policy interest 
rate. 
With respect to the inflation and real GDP growth rates, 
t is the annual inflation rate in 
China and 
ty is measured as the deviation of GDP annual growth rate from its trend. The 
deviation is captured by Hodrick and Prescott's (1997) filter. To compensate for the end-of-
sample problem in the case of the Hodrick-Prescott Filter, the forecast of 2012 real GDP is 
employed. In May 2012, World Bank forecasted that China’s 2012 GDP growth rate would 
be 8.2% (Zhao, 2012). Deposit benchmark rate ( DB ) spans between 2% and 11% with the 
mean of 3.6%. The average of deposit and lending benchmark ( LDB ) varies between 3.6% 
and 11.255%. The unit root results based on Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests indicate 
that all variables are stationary. Therefore, the model can be estimated at variable level rather 
than first difference.  
Following Fan et al. (2011), the model is estimated using non-linear least squares (NLS) 
which is best applied to the model with unknown parameter i.e.
 
 . The residual term 
implies the Taylor-Gap which is the difference between the actual interest rate and the target 
rate under Taylor rule. A positive residual term reflects a tightening monetary policy while 
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the negative one indicates an expansionary monetary policy. We denote 𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟1  and 
𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟2 as the Taylor-Gaps (i.e. residual terms) obtained from the estimations with deposit 
benchmark rate ( DB ) and with the average of lending and deposit benchmark rates ( LDB ), 
respectively. 𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟1  and Taylor2 are free of unit root and serial correlation. The 
estimations results indicate that the PBC tends to increase the deposit benchmark rate ( DB ) 
and the average of lending and deposit benchmark rate ( LDB ) in response to the increase in 
inflation rate and the output gap. (results provided upon request). This supports the evidence 
documented by Fan et al. (2011). 
3.4 Definitions of Variables 
To measure risk-taking, we use z-score developed by Boyd et al. (1993). z-score has been 
widely used in the risk-taking literature such as Berger et al. (2009), De Nicolò et al. (2010), 
Tabak et al. (2010), Gaggl and Valderrama (2010), Michalak (2012). Tabak et al. (2010) and 
Delis et al. (2011) point out that z-score is a proper proxy for risk-taking because it is able to 
measure the distance from insolvency of banks. z-score combines profitability, leverage, and 
return volatility in a single measure (Berger et al., 2009). It is argued that risk taking and 
credit risk do not refer to the same issue, and that z-score captures the risk taking incentive 
(i.e. overall risk) rather than credit risk because banks can offset the increase in credit risk by 
holding more capital (to reduce leverage) which in fact reduces their overall risk (Berger et 
al., 2009). Algebraically, z-score represents the probability of insolvency by reflecting the 







   (10) 
where ROA is the return on assets, EA is the ratio of equity to total assets, and ( )ROA  is 
the standard deviation of ROA over a rolling window of 4-year period. As z-score is an 
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inverse proxy of the bank's total risk-taking or risk of default e.g. the smaller the z-score, the 
higher insolvency risk, we denote the risk-taking proxy (RISK) as the negative of z-score, i.e. 
( )RISK z score   , the higher the z-score, the lower the RISK and lower risk-taking. 
To control for the risk arising from borrowers’ weakened balance sheet (Bernanke et al., 
1999), we follow Altunbas et al. (2010) and include the variable STOCK which is Shanghai 
Stock Exchange Composite Index to capture industry risk. Prior studies also suggest that 
general economic conditions and future expectations of economic activity may affect banks’ 
risk-taking. Following Altunbas et al. (2010), we control for this effect by including real GDP 
growth rate one-year ahead, denoted by Y.  
To obtain the involuntary excess reserve index (IER), the involuntary excess reserves ratio 
(IERR) is normalised using both the mean of the corresponding year and the mean of the 
sample as indicated in the formula 14. We denote IER1 and IER2 as involuntary excess 
reserves obtained from the normalization process with involuntary excess reserve ratios 
IERR1 and IERR2, respectively. To control for the bank lending channel (see Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1988; Gambacorta, 2005), we include bank-specific characteristics i.e. liquidity 
(LIQ), bank size (SIZE) and capitalisation (CAP) which are defined in line with the study of 











































































  (14) 
where N and T are number of observations and number of years, respectively. Moreover, L 
denotes liquid assets as defined by BankScope, which includes cash, government bonds, 
short-term claims on other banks (including certificates of deposit), and, where appropriate 
the trading portfolio. C and A refer to equity (capital) and total assets, respectively. 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the variables. Taylor1 and Taylor2 are obtained 
from the residuals of Taylor rule estimations, and they are normally distributed and have 
zero-mean property. Taylor1 varies between -0.7% and 0.7%, Taylor2 fluctuates between -
0.3% and 0.4%. Both Taylor1 and Taylor2 are positive in 50% of number of observations. 
IER1 and IER2 have the means of zero. IER1 ranges from -22% to 0.33% of deposits and is 
positive in 44% of number of observations. IER2 deviates from -12% to 32% of deposits and 
is also positive in 44% of number of observations. z-score has the mean of 36.15 and ranges 
from 1.23 to 99.4, and reflectively RISK varies between -99.4 and -1.23 with the mean of -
36.15. Table 2 provides the unit-root tests results for the variables. The Augmented Dickey-
Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit-root tests results indicate that all the variables are stationary.  
    (Insert Tables 1 & 2 here please) 











Taylor1 0 0.003 0.201 1.46 -0.007 0.007 0.4 
Taylor2 0 0.002 -0.105 -1.617 -0.003 0.004 1.54 
z-score 36.152 22.187 0.906 0.144 1.23 99.4 47.82* 
RISK -
36.152 
22.187 -0.906 0.144 -99.4 -1.23 47.82* 




Y 0.099 0.010 -0.136 -0.494 0.071 0.114 10.44* 
IER1 0 0.046 1.35 11.712 -0.219 0.328 2651* 
IER2 0 0.041 2.227 15.05 -0.12 0.32 2576* 
LIQ 0.004 0.132 1.759 4.508 -0.213 0.635 654.2* 
CAP 0.001 0.12 3.489 13.948 -0.229 0.78 4893* 
SIZE 0 2.058 0.522 0.006 -4.724 5.202 26.53* 








Taylor1 -8.044* -9.725* 
Taylor2 -6.531* -6.713* 
z-score 163.0117* 163.0117* 
RISK 163.0117* 163.0117* 
STOCK 819.1679* 819.1679* 
Y 644.8130* 334.8188* 
IER1 575.7617* 575.7617* 
IER2 225.648* 225.648* 
LIQ 311.8068* 311.8068* 
CAP 244.7292* 244.7292* 
SIZE 252.3623* 262.1405* 






3.5 Econometric Model 
3.5.1 System Generalised Method of Moments (SGMM) Model 
Following the studies of Altunbas et al. (2010), Tabak et al. (2010), and Delis and Kouretas 
(2011), the risk-taking is estimated by the following dynamic model: 
1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 6 1
7 , 1 1 8 1 9 1 10 11
it i i t i t i t i t i t t
i t t t t it t it
RISK RISK LIQ SIZE CAP IER Taylor
IER Taylor STOCK Y OWNERSHIP YEAR
      
     
     
   
      
      
 (15)  
where 𝛼𝑖  is a constant term,  𝜀𝑖𝑡  is a well-behaved error term. RISK is measured as the 
negative of z-score. The interaction term 𝐼𝐸𝑅 × 𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟 captures the impact of involuntary 
excess reserves on risk-taking in response to the monetary policy regime change. The 
Chinese monetary policy is argued to be more enforceable to Chinese state-owned banks 
compared to non-state-owned banks (Geiger, 2008). Prior studies also point out that foreign 
banks can seek for fund support from home banks and become less affected by monetary 
policy shock (Tabak et al., 2010; Ahtik, 2012). We control for ownership effect by including 
OWNERSHIP dummy which has the value of 1 for state-owned banks, 2 for non-state-owned 
banks and 3 for foreign banks. YEAR is a time dummy variable.  
Taking into account the relatively small sample period, only the first lag of dependent 
variable is considered, and this is in line with prior studies (see Altunbas et al., 2010; Tabak 
et al., 2010). ‘System’ GMM (SGMM) estimator is use to estimate the model because 
ordinary least squares estimator (OLS) is biased in dynamic models. SGMM developed by 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) and further advanced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) provides consistent estimation in dynamic model with lags of 
dependent variable. Moreover, SGMM is efficient on unbalanced panel with high N/T ratio 
(where N is number of groups and T is time periods) (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Roodman, 
2006). In addition, SGMM also allow for fixed effect in the panel (Arellano and Bover, 
1995). SGMM is implemented by command xtabond2 on STATA package. Taylor-gap 
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(𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟) is considered as an endogenous variable. The interaction term, ownership and time 
dummies are treated as strictly exogenous variables, the others are treated as predetermined 
variables. The optimal model is selected based on the criteria suggested by (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991) and Roodman (2006, 2009) in Appendix 1. 
3.5.2 Monetary Policy Dummy Model 
Altunbas et al. (2010), Gaggl and Valderrama (2010), Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) and 
Michalak (2012) point out that the positive Taylor-gap indicates the tightening monetary 
policy regime and the negative Taylor-gap indicates the expansionary monetary policy 
regime. We further study the effect of the tightening monetary policy regime on risk-taking 
behaviour by examining the monetary policy dummy instead of the level of Taylor-gap as in 
the SGMM model. The monetary policy dummy model is presented as follows: 
1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 6 1
7 , 1 1 8 1 9 1 10 11
it i i t i t i t i t i t t
i t t t t it t it
RISK RISK LIQ SIZE CAP IER DTaylor
DIER DTaylor STOCK Y OWNERSHIP YEAR
      
     
     
   
      
      
 (16) 
where DTaylor and DIER are monetary policy dummy and involuntary excess reserves 
dummy variables, respectively. The monetary policy dummy has the value of 1 if the 
monetary policy index is positive (𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟 > 0), indicating the tightening monetary policy 
regime. The monetary policy dummy has the value of 0 if the monetary policy index is non-
positive (𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟 ≤ 0), indicating the expansionary monetary policy regime. The involuntary 
excess reserve dummy has the value of 1 for the positive involuntary excess reserve (IER > 
0), and 0 for non-positive involuntary excess reserve (IER ≤ 0). The involuntary excess 
reserve dummy value of 1 indicates that banks hold unwanted reserves and are willing to take 
aggressive lending. The interaction between the monetary policy dummy and the involuntary 
excess reserve dummy gives the value of 1 for the case of positive involuntary excess reserve 
in the tightening monetary policy regime. Similarly, the interaction has the value of 0 for the 
cases with expansionary monetary policy regime (for both positive and negative involuntary 
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excess reserve), and with negative involuntary excess reserve (for both tightening and 
expansionary monetary policy regimes). The values of the interaction term are illustrated in 
Figure 1. The interaction between monetary policy dummy and involuntary excess reserve 
dummy reflects the effect of tightening policy regime on the risk-taking behaviour of banks 
that have positive involuntary excess reserves. The model is estimated by SGMM estimator 
because OLS is biased in dynamic model. 
 
    (Insert Figure 1 here please) 
Figure1: The Interaction between Monetary Policy Dummy (𝑫𝑻𝒂𝒚𝒍𝒐𝒓)  
and Involuntary Excess reserves Dummy (DIER) 





Positive involuntary  




Expansionary monetary policy (0) 
4 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Main Estimations Results and Discussion 
The two models are estimated by two alternative measures of involuntary excess reserves (i.e. 
𝐼𝐸𝑅1 and 𝐼𝐸𝑅2) and two alternative monetary policy indexes (i.e. 𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟1 and 𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟2). 
The estimations residuals are free of unit root and serial correlation. The results for SGMM 
and Monetary Policy Dummy estimations are reported in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. The 
three bank-specific characteristics - 𝐿𝐼𝑄, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 and 𝐶𝐴𝑃 do not show any significant impacts 
on risk taking. Banks tend to take greater risk at higher stock index 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾. Similarly, the 
expectation of higher future economic growth (Y) tends to induce banks to take greater risk.   
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The involuntary excess reserves (IER) have a positive relationship with risk taking (RISK) as 
expected, supporting the hypothesis H1. The positive relationship is slightly significant for 
the SGMM estimations but becomes more significant in the Monetary Policy Dummy 
estimations. This result indicates that, banks with larger involuntary excess reserves tend to 
take greater risk. This evidence is in line with the theory that excess liquidity impact on the 
bank risk taking behaviour (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). The positive relationship between 
involuntary excess reserves and risk taking may be resulted from the volume-based 
compensation policy in Chinese banks. In the presence of involuntary excess reserves, the 
illiquidity risk is considered to be low and bank managers appear to lend out aggressively to 
increase credit volume and compensation. Under the volume-based compensation policy, the 
liquidity surplus may induce the bank managers to aggressively lend out by relaxing lending 
standards, and therefore the banks take in greater risk (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012).       









    (17) 








. As the negative 6  is not significant, monetary policy stance (𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟) indicates 
insignificant negative impact on risk taking for both 𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟1  and 𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟2  estimations, 
failing to support the second hypothesis (H2). When 𝐼𝐸𝑅  increases, the tightening of 
monetary policy tends to reduce risk taking as 7  is negative and significant. Similarly, the 
monetary policy dummy, (𝐷𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟),  exerts no significant effect on bank risk taking 
behaviour. The results indicate that there is no significant difference on banks’ risk taking 
behaviour between tightening and expansionary monetary policy regimes. These findings 
contradict the evidence documented by Jimenez et al. (2009) and Ioannidou et al. (2009) who 
find that expansionary monetary policy induces banks to take in greater risk.  
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In the SGMM model, the interaction between involuntary excess reserves and monetary 
policy (𝐼𝐸𝑅 × 𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟) is found to be negative to the risk taking although only significant in 
estimations 1 and 3. Similarly, in the Monetary Policy Dummy model, the interaction 
between monetary policy dummy and involuntary excess reserve dummy (𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑅 ×
𝐷𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟)  also has the negative relationship with risk taking, and this relationship is 
significant across all the estimations, supporting hypothesis 3. These results indicate that 
banks with larger involuntary excess reserves tend to reduce risk taking more rapidly in 
response to the tightening monetary policy. This is in line with the studies of Jimenez et al. 
(2009) and Ioannidou et al. (2009), although these prior studies focus on the impact of 
monetary policy on risk taking of liquid banks rather than banks with involuntary excess 
reserves. In short, although the tightening monetary policy does not appear to reduce risk 
taking behaviour of Chinese banks (H2), it tends to hold back the risk taking behaviour 
induced by involuntary excess reserves (H3). This finding is consistent with Rajan’s (2006) 
argument that tightening monetary policy can materialise tail risk. When the tail risk is 
materialised and becomes no longer easy to be concealed, the risk taking incentive of 
involuntary excess reserves is restrained. Therefore, the tightening monetary policy tends to 
reduce the risk taking incentive of involuntary excess reserves.  
 








Table 3: Impact of Monetary Policy and Involuntary Excess Reserves  
on Risk-taking – SGMM Estimations 
Dependent Variable: 
































































































228 200 228 200 
Number of groups 70 63 70 63 
Number of 
instruments 
36 56 36 56 
Hansen p-value 0.987 0.832 0.983 0.842 
Note: 1. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively.  







Table 4: Impact of Monetary Policy and Involuntary Excess Reserves  
on Risk-taking – Monetary Policy Dummy Estimations 
Dependent 
Variable: 




























































































228 200 228 200 
Number of groups 70 63 70 63 
Number of 
instruments 
36 36 30 36 
Hansen p-value 0.991 0.997 0.989 0.997 
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Note: 1. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. 
          2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
4.2 Additional Analysis and Robustness Tests 
It is argued that, the PBC sets loan limits mainly to the four state-owned banks to moderate 
credit supply (Geiger, 2008), and the loan limits may restrain the risk taking behaviour of the 
state-owned banks. To overcome the loan limit effect and check the robustness of the study 
results, we exclude the four state-owned banks from the sample. The robust estimations show 
the similar results to the main estimations where the four state-owned banks are included.  
Prior studies suggest that the change in Chinese accounting standards in 2008 may cause data 
inconsistency in financial statements reporting. To address this concern, Chow tests (see 
Chow, 1960) are employed to check for the model stability in two periods before and after 
2008. The Chow tests results show that there is no significant difference in the estimated 
parameters between the two periods. We also control for the effect of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) on financial statements reporting by including M&A dummy, the results 
are identical to the main estimations that exclude M&A dummy. Prior studies also suggest 
that city commercial banks and rural commercial banks tend to operate within a provincial 
scale rather than a national scale (Xu, 2011), we control this effect by using expected 
provincial GDP growth for city commercial banks and rural commercial banks while the 
expected national GDP growth is used for other banks. The robustness results are similar to 
the main estimations where the expected national GDP growth is used for all banks. Beside 
the monetary policy stance index (𝑇𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑟), we also control for the revaluation effect of 
monetary policy shock on risk-taking (see Adrian and Shin, 2009, 2010) by incorporating the 
change in one-year deposit benchmark rate and the change in the reserve requirement ratio 
which is used as a primary tool to sterilise excess liquidity in the banking system (Anderson, 
2009). We denote 𝐼𝑃 (interest rate policy) and RRR as the change in deposit benchmark rate 
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and the change in reserve requirement ratio, respectively. The robustness results show that 
the effects of involuntary excess reserves and monetary policy stance on risk-taking are 
similar to the main estimations where monetary policy interest rates and reserve requirement 
ratio are not included. We also examine the difference in risk-taking behaviour of banks that 
have and lack involuntary excess reserves. In the Monetary Policy Dummy model, we replace 
the level of involuntary excess reserves (IER) with involuntary excess reserve dummy 
variable (DIER). The results show that banks with positive involuntary excess reserves tend 
to take greater risk compared to banks with negative involuntary excess reserves. Banks with 
positive involuntary excess reserves also tend to reduce risk-taking more rapidly in response 
to the tightening monetary policy. This is consistent with the main findings and supports the 
hypotheses H1 and H3. The summary of the robustness tests is presented in Table 5. The 
results of additional analysis and robustness tests are not reported but available upon request. 
5 Summary and Policy Implications 
This study examines the effects of involuntary excess reserves and monetary policy stance on 
risk-taking behaviour of Chinese banks. The study finds that banks with large involuntary 
excess reserves tend to take greater risk. Tightening monetary policy does not appear to 
significantly reduce risk-taking behaviour. However, during the tightening monetary policy 
regime, banks with larger involuntary excess reserves tend to reduce risk-taking more rapidly. 
This evidence implies that tightening monetary policy can materialise the tail risk and make 
the tail risk no longer easy to be concealed, and therefore, the risk-taking incentive of the 
involuntary excess reserve is restrained.  
Since 2003, the PBC has been using reserve requirement as a primary tool to reduce excess 
liquidity in the banking system (Anderson, 2009), the finding of this study suggests that the 
PBC can also increase the policy benchmark rate to reduce the risk-taking behaviour driven 
by involuntary excess reserves. Although the evidence documented in this study appears 
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significant and contributes to under-researched topic, the sample size appears to be the 
limitation of the study. Further studies appear warranted if quarterly data becomes available 
to better capture the impact of monetary policy on risk-taking under in the text of large 
involuntary excess reserves in the Chinese banking system.       
 
Table 5 Additional Analysis and Robustness Tests for Risk-taking Estimations 
Issue Test performed Specification Finding 






estimations for the 
sample which 
excludes the four 
state-owned banks. 
The four state-owned banks 
are excluded from the 
sample. 
No significant difference 
in the results compared 
with estimations which 
include the four state-
owned commercial banks 









Chow test for periods before 
and after 2008 
No significant difference 
in the parameters between 






controlled for M&A 
Include M&A dummies 
with value of 1 for merger 
and acquisition event and 0 
otherwise 
No significant difference 
in the results compared 
with main estimations 
which do not include 
M&A dummy. 






Expected national real GDP 
growth rate is applied for 
State-owned commercial 
banks, joint stock 
commercial banks and 
foreign banks. Expected 
provincial real GDP growth 
rate is applied for city 
commercial banks and rural 
commercial banks. 
No significant difference 
in the results compared 
with estimations where 
expected national GDP 
growth rate is used for all 
banks. 
Revaluation effect of 






controlled for policy 
Include the change in 
deposit benchmark rate and 
reserve requirement ratio 
into the SGMM estimations. 
No significant difference 
in the results compared 
with estimations which do 
not include policy interest 
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interest rate and 
reserve requirement 
shocks 




banks with positive 
IER against banks 





In the dummy model, 
replace IER by IER dummy 
(DIER) 
Banks with positive IER 
tend to take greater risk 
and reduce risk-taking 
more rapidly compared to 
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Appendix 1 xtabond2 Model Selection Criteria 
Criteria Requirements Description 
F-test Reject the null hypothesis that independent variables are jointly 
equal to zero 
Arellano-Bond test First-order serial correlation but no second-order serial 
correlation in the residuals (Arelano and Bond, 1991) 
Sargan Test Sargan statistic is biased in one-step estimator with ‘Robust’ 





P value ≥ 0.25 (Roodman, 2009) 
P value of 1 is the sign of inappropriate model (Roodman, 2009) 
Steady state The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
should have a value less than (absolute) unity (Roodman, 2009) 
Number of 
instruments 
The number of instruments should not exceed the number of 
groups (i.e. number of banks) (Roodman, 2009) 
Optimal 
instruments 
Roodman (2006, 2009) suggests reporting how the optimal 
number of instruments. The standard treatment on lag-limits is 
used, such that lag-limits start from lag2 for endogenous variable 
(and from lag1 for exogenous and predetermined) to the most 
available lag. The ‘collapse’ option is used to keep the number of 
instruments within Stata’s size limit. A number of other 
regressions are estimated by adjusting the upper and lower lag-
limits. The regression which satisfies all the criteria listed above 
and has highest p-value of Hansen J test is selected as the optimal 
regression. 
Source: Roodman, 2006; Roodman, 2009; Arelano and Bond, 1991 
 
